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Abstract
The theory of human capital is one way to explain individual de-
cisions to produce scientific research. However, this theory, even if it
reckons the importance of time in science, is too short for explaining
the existing diversity of scientific output. The present paper introduces
the social capital of Bourdieu (1980), Coleman (1988) and Putnam
(1995) as a necessary complement to explain the creation of scientific
human capital. This paper connects these two concepts by means of
a hierarchical econometric model which makes the distinction between
the individual level (human capital) and the cluster level of depart-
ments (social capital). The paper shows how a collection of variables
can be built from a bibliographic data base indicating both individ-
ual behaviour including mobility and collective characteristics of the
department housing individual researchers. The two level hierarchical
model is estimated on fourteen European countries using bibliometric
data in the fields of economics.
Keywords: Economics of science, human capital, social capital, hierarchical
models, European science.
JEL codes: I21, D91, C49
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1 Introduction
What are the motivations for academics to engage in scientific research and
which outside factors influence their publication performance? These are
two questions among others addressed in the field of economics of science.
In their survey papers, Stephan (1996) and Diamond (1996) suggest a diver-
sity of explanations for the individual production of scientific papers. Above
the simple satisfaction of scientific curiosity, one of the main motivations of
scientists is the recognition awarded by the scientific community for being
the first to publish a main discovery. There is no prize for being second,
remember the dispute around the discovery of the HIV. Because of this race,
scientific activity becomes such a risky adventure that wages depends only
for a fraction on scientific output. The American sociologist Merton (1968)
pointed out the Matthew effect which shows that mature and recognised
scientists are rewarded, both financially and by citations, above their real
merit. The combination of these two characteristics (race for being the first
and over recognition of already matured scientists) might explain the fact
that we can observe scientists with an important and continuous production
together with scientists who have a more cyclical production. This is illus-
trated for instance by Lotka (1926) whose famous statistical law models the
concentration of publications among very few scientists.
A major ingredient for individual scientific production is human capital
which is a combination of basic intelligence and accumulation of efficient
knowledge. The life-cycle theory predicts that, due to the finiteness of life,
investment declines over time. Combined with a depreciation of human cap-
ital, this explains the inverted U shape of scientific output. Several models
were developed around this idea, notably by McDowell (1982), Diamond
(1984, 1987) and Levin and Stephan (1991). These models recognise the
importance of time in scientific discovery.
However, these models, mainly based on time trends and cohorts effects,
even if they do find an age-publishing relationship, do lack an explanatory
power for irregularities in the flow of output. Using panel data, Levin and
Stephan (1991) introduce individual fixed effects to take into account the
differences in productivity which are not explained by a life-cycle effect. But
apart from displaying individual effects, no rational explanation for diversity
is provided.
Life-cycle models are based strictly on individual behaviour, ignoring
one fundamental aspect of human capital which is increased by sharing.
Surroundings, contextual effects, networking are determinant. Following
Coleman (1988), the accumulation of human capital needs another ingredi-
ent that Bourdieu (1980) was the first to call social capital. If the notion
of human capital comes from the economics literature and was the object
of considerable modeling efforts, the notion of social capital comes mainly
from the sociological literature which includes very little modeling. Coleman
2
(1988) provides justifications for showing how the two notions (human cap-
ital and social capital) can work together, taking the example of education
to build his demonstration. But he provides no formal mathematical model.
The aim of this paper is to combine into a single econometric model the
individual publishing behaviour explained by the life-cycle model together
with individual effects and the social capital “model” represented by institu-
tional characteristics variables. This combination will be operated by means
of a two level hierarchical model. The paper is organised as follows. After
reviewing the traditional human capital model of scientific production and
proposing an estimable equation in section 2, we expose in section 3 how
individual publishing strategies can be derived from a bibliometric data base
and used to model individual fixed effects. In section 4, we show how the
notion of social capital and its two accepted definitions can be transposed
to the framework of economics of science. The next section is devoted to
identifying institution variables which characterise scientific cooperation and
social capital using bibliometric data bases. Section 6 reviews hierarchical
linear models of Lindley and Smith (1972) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002).
In section 7, we estimate our econometric model on a sample of European
economists coming from fourteen different European countries and covering
the period 1991-2007. In section 8, we show how these models can be used
to rank economic departments. Section 9 concludes.
2 A model of life-cycle productivity for scientists
Most of the human capital models explaining the research productivity of
scientists are based on the model in continuous time of Ben-Porath (1967).
This model describes the accumulation of human capital and explains the
life-cycle profile of earnings. Individuals invest in their human capital when
they are young, anticipating future earnings. They continue to invest in
their human capital after their initial formation, but at a lower rate which
becomes zero at the end of their career. For instance the model used in
Levin and Stephan (1991) is based on this theoretical framework. However,
when it comes to estimation, we have to consider discrete time and calendar
years. So instead of linearising a model initially devised in continuous time,
we prefer to start directly from an economic model specified in discrete time
and will follow, at least partly Diamond (1984) and adapt ideas taken in
Diamond (1987), McDowell (1982) and Heckman et al. (2003).
2.1 Intertemporal optimisation
In models for explaining scientific production, the main decision variable is
st ∈ [0, 1] which allocates time within a year between using human capital
Kt in a proportion (1 − st) for earning money and in a proportion st for
augmenting the existing stock of human capital. In academia, (1−st) is the
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proportion of time devoted to routine academic occupation such as teaching,
supervising PhD students, refereeing papers, participating to administrative
tasks, while st is the proportion of time devoted to the writing of articles
or books that will increase the prestige of the scientist, her number of cita-
tions, the recognition she has from her peers. The production function for
supplementary human capital Qt takes the simple form
Qt = β(stKt)
α. (1)
In Diamond (1987), human capital is seen as the prestige gained by a scien-
tist and measured by the citations that other scientists make to her work.
Due to the continuous progress of science, citations decrease over time and
human capital experiences an obsolescence at rate δ so that the yearly vari-
ation of Kt is given by
∆Kt = −δKt−1 +Qt−1. (2)
The objective function of the scientist is assumed to be the maximisation of
her discounted future income. Current income Yt is provided by the exercise
of her routine academic work, which consists globally in renting her human
capital for a unit wage w
Yt = w(1− st)Kt. (3)
This assumption is coherent with the observation that wages in academia do
not depend directly on current scientific production, but mostly on routine
academic work. Scientific output is primordial only for promotion or tenure
acquisition. In the initial period of formation, Yt = 0 because st = 1. In the
second period of scientific activity, st < 1, because this is the period when
money is earned. With an actualisation rate of r, the objective function
simply writes:
U =
T∑
t
1
(1 + r)t
w(1 − st)Kt, (4)
T corresponding to the age of retirement. Diamond (1984) notices that with
a general production function, the maximisation of U implies that st will
decrease as t→ T . In order to formalise this life-cycle effect, we shall follow
the procedure used in the derivation of a Mincer wage equation as detailed
in Heckman et al. (2003). We will thus propose for st an had hoc expression
which fulfils the time diminishing property. The derivation of a complete
model in continuous time is proposed in the appendix.
2.2 An explicit solution
Let us first solve by successive substitutions the combination of (1) and (2)
for α = 1 so as to obtain:
Kt =
t−1∏
j=0
(1 + βsj − δ)K0. (5)
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Distinguishing between a first period of formation where st = 1, devoted to
the writing of the PhD dissertation and a second period where st < 1 and
using logs, we have
logKt = logK0 +
p−1∑
j=0
log(1 + β − δ) +
t−1∑
j=p
log(1 + βsj − δ). (6)
The first period lasts p years while the maximum length of the second period
is T − p years. Using the approximation log(1 + x) ≃ x, we get
logKt ≃ logK0 + p(β − δ)− (t− p− 1)δ + β
t−1∑
j=p
sj, (7)
or expressed in term of academic experience e = t− p:
logKt ≃ logK0 + p(β − δ) − (e− 1)δ + β
e−1∑
j=0
sj+p, (8)
We now introduce the assumption that st is time decreasing with the fol-
lowing linear expression
se = κ(1−
e
T − p
), (9)
so that sT−p = 0. The optimal capital stock is given by:
logKt = logK0 + p(β − δ) + δ + e(βκ(1 +
1
2(T )
)− δ) − e2
1
2(T )
, (10)
as
∑e−1
j=0(1 − j/(T − p) = e(1 + 1/2(T − p)) − e
2/2(T − p). Its variation in
percentage being:
∆ logKt = −δ + βκ(1 −
t− p− 1
T − p
).
The stock of capital decreases linearly due to the effect of depreciation and
of diminishing investment.
2.3 An estimable equation
The log of the human capital stock of a scientist with experience e at time
t is a function of her initial conditions (logK0), a term related to the initial
period of formation (p(β − δ)), a trend and a squared trend in experience.
In usual Mincer equations, p represents the number of years of schooling.
In science, the period of formation is entirely devoted to writing a PhD
dissertation and we can suppose that this period is identical for everybody.
However, because of the secular progress of science, the date of the PhD can
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be of importance. It is usually supposed that younger cohorts are more pro-
ductive than older ones. At least, this has to be tested. Levin and Stephan
(1991) introduce individual fixed effects in one of their equation, which is
possible in their case because of the panel structure of their model. We have
not this possibility here as our equation explains a stock of capital measured
at the end of a period. So we have to introduce individual characteristics by
mean of exogenous variables xi to be determined later on. We have finally
an estimable equation of the following form where i denotes an individual:
logKi = β0 + ρpi + β1ei − β2e
2
i + x
′
iβ + vi. (11)
β0 is a constant term measuring a global mean score, pi the date of PhD
for individual i, ei is her academic experience and xi a set of personal char-
acteristics. The dependant variable is a stock of weighted publications. In
order to give flesh to these variables, we have now to discuss the content of
our data base.
3 The data base and its informational content
Formally, the information we need to estimate this first model would be
contained in three different data bases: a list of PhD recipients, a list of
department members and a bibliographical data base, such as that provided
for instance by the Web of Science. Levin and Stephan (1991) underlined
that for matching those three files, they had to ask the help of the National
Research Council, because of the confidential nature of some of the lists. In
this paper, we claim that most of the information we need is contained in
bibliographical data bases, provided the latter includes affiliations. We shall
use the ECONLIT data base, because it is the only one to contain detailed
affiliations (the SSCI and SCI do not). We have thus to restrain ourselves
to the economic profession. Our data cover the period 1991-2007 which
represents a maximum span of 17 years.1 We have selected in the data
base fourteen European countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK. They represent the major EEC countries having
an important higher education sector.
3.1 Measuring individual scores and experience
The stock of human capital is difficult to define and to measure. Both
McDowell (1982) and Levin and Stephan (1991) have chosen to estimate a
1We could not consider a longer period, because affiliations are not reported before 1991
in ECONLIT. Note also that ECONLIT was much more difficult to access for bibliometric
studies after 2007. For more details on this data base, see Lubrano et al. (2003).
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production equation where the dependent variable is the number of publica-
tions in a given year. For measuring the stock of human capital, (2) favours
a measure based on the discounted sum of weighted publications. We want
to take into account the obsolescence of knowledge. A paper written 20
years ago for an active researcher has less value than an article written last
year. McDowell (1982) has estimated the yearly obsolescence of a paper in
different fields using the data of the Journal Citation Reports. He found
δ = 13% for economics. With this assumption, we have
Ki =
lpyi∑
t=fpyi
nit∑
j=1
vj(1− δ)
lpyi−t+1. (12)
In this formula, nit is the number of articles published by author i in year
t; vj an index measuring the quality of the journal: 1 for low quality till 10
for the narrow list of top journals. fpyi and lpyi are respectively the first
and last publishing years of author i.
We have used different values of δ according to the journal in which
a paper is published. Papers in top journals have on average a longer
citation life than papers published in lower ranked journals. The JCR
publishes for each journal a half life citation indicator. We used it to
compute a variable discount rate which covers the range [6.67, 50%], δ =
1− exp(log(0.50)/half-life). For journals not in the JCR, we took the mean
of their category.
Levin and Stephan (1991) have a complete view of the experience of
each author by having access: first to a list of PhD recipients with the
date of their PhD, second to a member list for five top US universities and
third to publication lists of the Web of Science. But they have introduced
a selection bias because they selected only a very small portion of the PhD
receivers; they had to introduce a correction for this selection bias. We
have no selection bias because we consider all authors that have declared
an academic affiliation in the ECONLIT data base. However, we do not
know when a person started her academic career or the date of her PhD. We
know only her first date of publication FPYi and her last date of publication
LPYi. We assume that FPYi is the starting year of scientific career. For
the observed ending year of career, we have two possibilities. Either we take
the date of the end of the sample or we take LPYi, the date of the last
publication. For the while, we have decided to measure total experience ei
as:
ei = LPYi − FPYi + 1.
As we are considering a specific period of time (1991-2007), ei measures
the time needed to accumulate a given stock of publications. It does not
measure exactly academic experience, because the data base does not include
for instance book chapters and so does not measure the complete output.
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3.2 The need to trim the data base
When appearing in the ECONLIT data base, an author can be a regular
academic member, a PhD student, a visitor or even an author with no aca-
demic affiliation. This make a much greater number of individuals than the
one given by academic affiliation lists. Even if we eliminate the authors
that have no academic affiliation, the data base still contains too many per-
sons. Table 1 shows that there is a huge difference between the content
of ECONLIT and for instance the number of economists that have regis-
tered in REPEC. That difference would be even larger when compared to
the number of persons holding an academic tenure. For instance, in their
study Henrekson and Waldenstro¨m (2008) report a mere total of 90 Swedish
economic professors, to be compared to the 1 601 initial records of our data
base.
Table 1: Sample characteristics
Country Academic Registered Productive
authors in REPEC authors
Austria 832 243 282
Belgium 1 729 536 575
Denmark 904 230 376
Finland 915 134 243
France 5 570 1 794 1 767
Germany 4 897 2 275 1 898
Greece 1 296 272 375
Ireland 438 157 181
Italy 4 132 1 920 1 092
Netherds 3 480 903 1 682
Spain 4 704 1 259 1 282
Sweden 1 601 400 703
Swiss 1 529 435 508
UK 12 729 2 324 5 786
Total 44 756 12 882 16 750
We have decided to eliminate authors with a too low activity. The cho-
sen criterion is Ki/ei < 1.5. This corresponds to eliminating authors who
publish less than three lowest graded papers in two years when δ = 0. With
this rule, we get figures that are not too far from those of REPEC. And we
have eliminated more than half of the initial sample.
3.3 Cohorts
We identified a vintage to the first year of publication. The empirical distri-
bution of FPY , graphed in Figure 1, illustrates the general slightly increas-
ing number of entries in the profession at the European level.
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Figure 1: First year of publication
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The y axis indicates the percentage of authors with a first year of publication
indicated on the x axis.
A vintage effect is usually difficult to identify because we have the linear
relation
calendar time = experience + Vintage.
We can introduce the first year of publication as an explanatory variable
together with experience as suggested in (11). The usual practice (see e.g.
Levin and Stephan 1991 or Rauber and Ursprung 2008) is to build dummy
variables corresponding intervals of several years, for instance four years for
each vintage. The dummy will be one if the first year of publication falls into
the corresponding interval, zero otherwise. We have a sample of 17 years,
which means three cohorts of four years (the average time for preparing a
PhD) and one cohort of five years. We have taken 1991-1994, 1995-1999,
2000-2003 and 2004-2007.
3.4 Individual characteristics
Bibliometric data bases can provide much information on the individuals
characteristics xij introduced in (11), in particular concerning their pub-
lishing strategies. We can distinguish between the choice of support of
publication (national journal, top journal) and their type of collaboration
(publishing alone, having international coauthors, choosing coauthors only
in the same institution).
Among the more than 1200 journals available for publication in eco-
nomics, we have pointed out two categories. The first category corresponds
to top journals in the field. The six top journals in economics are supposed
to be American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Economic The-
ory, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review
of Economic Studies. They are graded 10 on the scale used in Lubrano et al.
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(2003).2 An author having achieved to get such publications is supposed to
be a potential leader in her institution. We constructed a first variable called
P 10i which is 1 if an author has managed to publish at least one article in
that short list over the whole period and 0 otherwise.
The second category of journals that we pointed out are national jour-
nals.3 Authors publishing mostly in national journals favour national net-
works and thus avoid international competition. What is the consequence
of this practice on their total output? We have computed Pnji as the pro-
portion of articles that an author has published in national journals.
As research is a risky activity, there is an increasing tendency to publish
papers with a greater number of coauthors. But this choice is not uniform
among the disciplines. The number and the characteristics of coauthors is
a decision variable reflecting a particular type of collaboration or absence of
collaboration.
- We have defined Pali as the proportion of papers that an author has
written alone, reflecting thus the absence of collaboration.
- Conversely, Psii measures the proportion of papers that an author has
written with all coauthors belonging to the same institution. It is an
indication of the absence of collaboration with the outside world.
- On the contrary, Pinti measures the proportion of papers that an
author has published with at least one foreign coauthor. This last
variable measures international cooperation, but also the belonging to
outside social networks.4
An empirical question is then to know if these publishing habit variables
explain and replace the cohort effects. Before examining this question, we
have to introduce a new concept, that of social capital and see its operation
in the field of economics of science.
2We could also have chosen the ten top journals in term of total citations in 2008,
i.e. American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Econometrics, Review
of Economics and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, Economic Journal, Journal of
Economic Theory.
3A national journal can be easy to define, just by looking at the language it uses. But
sometimes a national journal turned for English as Economic Notes in Italy or Journal of
Economics in Germany or Spanish Economic Review in Spain. For the UK, the matter is
more complex. We have to look deeper into the journal. A journal has a national coverage
if it serves as a major means of diffusion for national authors. It is considered as mainly
national if in addition it does not serve as a major means of diffusion for other countries.
A more precise definition is given in Lubrano et al. (2003).
4We also created the variable Pmul which indicates multiple affiliations, but it was
never significant in the subsequent regressions.
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4 Social capital and scientific organisation
The life-cycle model gives a rational principle for individual action. But
it does not say anything about the institutional framework that facilitates,
shapes or limit individual actions. Contrary to physical capital, human
capital is expandable and self generating with use. It is transportable and
shareable. For instance, Coleman (1988) shows how the initial accumulation
of human capital relies on social context with the example of education. In
our case, we could ask the question what is a good place for writing a PhD?
We have to characterise the influence of the context on the production of
scientific knowledge. A department is not a mere collection of individuals,
there is something more that can be called the social capital of the depart-
ment. Following a branch of the sociological literature initiated by Bourdieu
(1980), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995), we would like to characterise
what could be the notion of social capital applied in the domain of the
economics of science. We shall propose in a next section how to measure it.
4.1 Two definitions of social capital
Following Coleman (1988), social capital is defined by its functions which are
to facilitate individual actions that otherwise would be either more difficult
or even impossible to achieve. When we try to go beyond this generality, we
discover that social capital can receive two types of contradictory definitions
as discussed in Siisia¨inen (2000). For Bourdieu (1980, 1986), the social
capital is simply the value of an individual social network. This network is
used as a resource in social competition and social reproduction. It explains
unequal achievements of otherwise equal individuals. On the contrary, for
the American tradition represented among others by Coleman (1988) and
Putnam (1995), social capital is a collective good made of moral obligations
and norms, social values and social networks. A society with a high level of
social capital is an integrated society, functioning on trust and collaboration.
Coleman (1988) demonstrated the importance of social capital in the process
of human capital accumulation using the example of education. He pointed
out the influence of a collaborative attitude of parents helping children for
their homework to illustrate the influence of social capital at the family
level. At the public level, he noted the very small dropout rate of students
in catholic schools compared to public schools, explaining this by a common
ideology of solidarity. Bourdieu on the contrary is very skeptical with respect
to altruistic actions. They cannot be free of any specific interest of the actor.
Individuals are engaged in social competition and do not value altruism. His
position is thus totaly opposed to Putnam’s and Coleman’s romantic ideas
of generalised trust.
If the theory of human capital has been widely used (and criticised) for
explaining scientific production, the theory of social capital has rarely been
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applied in the field of economics of science as underlined by Bozeman et al.
(2001). This last paper proposes to use some measures of social capital when
evaluating research projects.
4.2 Social capital and scientific collaboration
This dual conception of social capital matches perfectly the opposition that
exists in science between collaboration and competition. As we recalled in
the introduction, scientific research is motivated by peer recognition, collab-
oration, co-authorship, but at the same time by a race for being the first.
In a way or in another, social capital is imbedded in departments and uni-
versities characteristics. Researchers have networks, invite visitors, attend
seminars thanks to their university. The question is to know whether com-
petition is between departments and collaboration inside departments or
whether there is competition everywhere. In hard sciences, we can suppose
that competition is limited to competition between departments as the ex-
ploitation of large equipments need collaboration. Kim et al. (2009) found
that the specific university effect on researcher productivity has declined
over the last three decades even if top departments still manage to concen-
trate top researchers. However, Kim et al. (2009) consider only the case of
economics and finance faculties. This would lead to think that there is more
competition than collaboration in these departments. We can have doubts
on extending this interpretation to other departments.
Coleman (1988) details three forms of social capital: obligations and
expectations, information channels, and social norms. Coleman (1990) in-
troduces a fourth one with authority relations. We have three quasi identical
components in Putnam (1995)’s concept of social capital: social values such
as trust, social networks (especially voluntary associations) and moral obli-
gations and norms (see Siisia¨inen 2000). We shall now review these general
characteristics and see how they can be transcribed in the field of economics
of science, showing each time the possible bent induced by scientific compe-
tition.
1. obligations and expectations, trust and cooperation: you help some-
body once and you expect that in the future she will help you in the
same way if necessary. This is mutual reciprocity and trust. At a
department level, the best example is given by the relations between a
superviser and a PhD student where altruism plays a major role. The
PhD student expect good guidance, the professor expect good work
and outside recognition. Relations between colleagues of the same
department can be an illustration too. You discuss with a colleague
concerning a problem for which you need help. That colleague gives
you help and ideas. She then might expect either the same kind of ser-
vice in the future or being the co-author of your work if the discussion
12
goes far enough. But competition between two academics working on
the same topic can also exist.
2. Information channels: A community facilitates communication and
general information. Collecting information is costly while being strate-
gic; the group can provide it. In scientific communities, it is impossible
to read all journals in order to maintain up-to-date information: the
knowledge of the most recent research. Institutions organise seminars
and conferences in order to diffuse this information. This lead to meet
researchers outside the department and possibly to start new networks.
3. Social networks: Science is a risky activity, so that co-authorship can
be seen as an insurance against risk. A social network is built by gain-
ing new co-authors, either inside the same department, or outside it
as a result of conferences, seminars. So the institution, by facilitation
inside and outside communication, helps academics to build their so-
cial networks. This raises the question of individual mobility and its
benefit to the department which may loose members in the process.
4. Authority relations: a skillful leadership in a group that is fully ac-
cepted and enhance the performance of everybody. At a department
level, this is illustrated by the role that a scientific leader can play.
This is a top researcher who initiates new lines of research, write pa-
pers with other members of the group and has a decisive role in scien-
tific animation and in attracting new people. But also, the presence of
a leader can lead to sterile competition and prevent younger researcher
to take their full dimension (Matthew’s effect).
5. social norms: what is socially accepted and what is socially forbid-
den. What is imposed to the individual by the community in order
to behave according to public interest and not according to personal
interest. What is good scientific practice in relation with other scien-
tists? Plagiary, scientific forgery have always existed, but have always
been condemned and punished. Beyond saying what is allowed and
what is forbidden, the norm can go further by imposing a certain type
of publications. The importance of books is for instance declining in
economics at the advantage of articles. Finally, the social norm publish
or perish plays a fundamental role in scientific development. This is
an internal norm in a social group, an unwritten norm which became
explicit recently in some top departments. This social norm can lead
to positive behaviours. By forcing to a given level of publishing qual-
ity, it can favour the building of new networks. But it can also lead
to competition between groups or between single authors leading to
writing papers alone when one is convinced to have the right idea and
does not want to share it with others.
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We now detail how we can build indicators from bibliographical data
bases that give an account of these notions.
5 Tracking social capital in bibliometric data bases
Bibliographic data bases can provide information that goes far beyond count-
ing publications, provided we exploit them on a relatively long period. We
have seen how they can provide information on individuals’ characteristics.
They can also provide information on the main characteristics of the insti-
tutions housing the individual researchers. But of course, we will not be
able to measure all the five features of social capital described in section 4.
5.1 Allocating authors to an institution
We are interested in measuring the common characteristics of the human
capital hosted by an institution at the end of the period of observation. If
we had affiliations lists, we could know exactly the composition of a depart-
ment at a given date. However, we have no such lists and lists available
on the web are sometime hard to interpret because they include permanent
members, visitors and associate members. We think that an author knows
her affiliation when she declares it. We have chosen to affect an author
according to a rule based on her last declared affiliation.
When an author arrives in a new institution, she comes in with all her
stock of past publications, so that in our model Ki represents the total
stock of human capital of an author at the end of the period of observation,
whatever his past affiliations. This stock will be explained by personal
characteristics and by the characteristics (or social capital) of her present
affiliation.
The rule of the last declared affiliation for affecting an author to a de-
partment has to be applied with caution. First, there are errors in the data
base so that the last declared affiliation might not be the real affiliation,
coherent with the past declared affiliations. Second, we are going to explain
a stock of publications. If an author has just moved to a new affiliation, her
stock might not be so related with the characteristics of her new affiliation.
Considering these two reasons, we have designed the following procedure:
- An affiliation is a valid affiliation if the author declared that affiliation
at least for two different years, not necessarily consecutive. This def-
inition applies only to authors with at least four years of experience.
For those with three years of experience or less, we just consider all of
their affiliations as valid. This protocol should eliminate some of the
errors contained in the data base.
- An author is affected to a given valid affiliation if the last publication
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year in this affiliation is either the author’s last publication year or the
preceding year.
5.2 Measuring the social capital of an institution
As social capital is a collection of social relations inside a department that
facilitates individual scientific production by means of collaboration and of
social networks, we can imagine that there is a positive correlation between
the production of the different members of the same department and that
this correlation could measure the importance of collaborative social capital
in a department. The difference of individual performance between depart-
ments can be explained by a series of factors characterising differences in
social capital allocation.
- Interactions between authors can be favoured by the size of a depart-
ment. Below a minimal size, the possibilities of cooperation are nearly
zero. But cooperation can be also impeded by the anonymity created
by a too large number of colleagues. We call Nzj the total number of
active authors affiliated to department j.5
- The presence of a leader can have a tremendous effect, both by at-
tracting other top researchers and for supervising PhD students. We
can identify a top researcher and perhaps a leader by noting if she
belongs to the small circle of authors having published at least one
paper in a top journal. The variable N10j indicates the total number
of top researchers affiliated to a department.
- The history of a department can be tracked by the number of top re-
searchers that it has managed to attract in the past and that have left
it. We measure it with Nm10j . There is apparently a strong correla-
tion between N10j and Nm10j , meaning that present performance of
a department is a function of its past achievements.
- With Nmulj, we measure the proportion of authors having a current
multiple affiliation in a department. This might be a sign of a lack of
personal investment to the social capital of the department.
- The degree of openness to international cooperation can be measured
by the proportion of articles inside the institution which were written
with at least one foreign coauthor. We call this variable Nintj .
5In fact, Nzj indicates the total number of active members of a department and whose
last affiliation is department j, and not the total number of members of a department
because there can be inactive members who are not reported in the data base or who have
published in different outlets than journals.
15
Table 2: Correlation matrix for department characteristics
Nz N10 Nm10 Nal Nsia Nint Nei Nea Nmul
Nz 1.0 0.78 0.72 - 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.22 -
N10 0.78 1.0 0.90 - - 0.20 0.30 0.24 -
Nm10 0.72 0.90 1.0 - - 0.19 0.29 0.24 0.11
Nal - - - 1.0 - -0.25 - - -
Nsia 0.17 - - - 1.0 -0.19 0.21 - -0.14
Nint 0.13 0.19 0.18 -0.25 -0.19 1.0 - - 0.15
Nei 0.31 0.30 0.29 - 0.21 - 1.0 0.86 -
Nea 0.22 0.24 0.24 - - - 0.86 1.0 0.15
Nmul - - 0.11 - -0.14 0.15 - 0.15 1.0
Calculations are based on 512 departments. Significance is determined assuming that
r
√
n− 2/
√
1− r2 ∼ t(n− 2), using a 5% level of significance.
- The mean seniority in the department is also an important character-
isation. Is the department composed mainly of seniors or of juniors?
Neaj measures the mean total publishing experience of active mem-
bers of a department, while Neij corresponds to the mean affiliation
length in this institution.
- The degree of cooperation inside a department can be measured by two
antinomic variables: the proportion of papers that are produced alone
Nalj and the proportion of papers that are written with co-authors
belonging all to the same department Nsiaj .
5.3 Exploring the social characteristics of departments
Most of the previous variables are supposed to have a positive influence
on the accumulation of human capital. It is useful to analyse the correla-
tion matrix between these nine variables in order to statistically figure out
positive associations and to check also for the coherency of these.
We have 502 departments. We reproduce the correlation matrix, keep-
ing only the significant correlations. The inspection of Table 2 shows that
negative correlation usually results from a mechanical effect and thus are
not to be commented.
- Nal, the proportion of papers written alone is correlated with no other
variable. This seems to be a pure individual characteristics.
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- Nsia, representing inside collaboration depends positively on the size
Nz and on Nei the mean duration of affiliation in the institution,
indicating that it takes time to create fruitful inside collaboration.
- N10, the number of current top authors depends positively again on
the size, the history of the department(represented by the number of
leaders that have left), Nint the degree of international collaboration,
Nei the mean affiliation time in the institution and Nea the mean
total experience.
- There is a large inertia in the history of institutions as Nm10 and N10
are strongly correlated (0.90), and they are correlated with the same
variables. Top authors know the glorious past of an institution which
has a virtuous signaling effect.
- Nint represents international collaboration and depends positively
again on the size Nz, the number of leaders N10, the history of the
department Nm10 and the proportion of multiple affiliations Nmul.
Former researchers keep relations with their former institution and
multiple affiliations can be a by-product of this collaboration.
- Nei, the mean affiliation time, may be interpreted as the ability of
the institution to keep its members. It depends positively on the size
Nz, the number of leaders N10, Nm10 the history of the institution,
Nsia the ability of people to work together inside the institution, not
on international collaboration, and on Nea the total mean experience.
- Nmul, multiple affiliations seems to be an historical by product of
Nm10, of international collaboration Nint and of total experience
Nea.
As a summary, we have a bundle of positive association between size,
international collaboration, the attraction of new top researchers, institution
reputation. We expect these variables to have a positive impact on scientific
production. But we have at the same time negative by-products as multiple
affiliations, which are associated to the dispersion of social capital, are also
positively correlated with past history, international collaboration and total
experience.
5.4 Individual mobility
Individual mobility was identified by Putnam (1995) as a factor explaining
the decrease in US social capital. In his case, mobility endamages exist-
ing networks and volunteer associations. Can we conclude that mobility of
researchers between different universities indicates a lack of collective in-
vestment of the researcher in her institution? Or does mobility correspond
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to the dissemination of new ideas and thus benefits to the hosting institu-
tion which welcomes a new researcher? We have here an example where the
specificity of academic science can imply totally different consequences.
Mobility can easily be tracked by means of the declared affiliations.
There is mobility whenever the last affiliation is different from the previ-
ous or initial affiliation. We can identify two types of individual mobility:
Pmii indicates past mobility inside the same country; Pmoi indicates mobil-
ity between two different countries. Finally, we have noted with Pmuli the
fact that an author has multiple affiliations. In Table 3, we have reported
Table 3: Individual mobility within Europe of productive authors
Country Authors No change National Foreign
mobility mobility
All Top All Top All Top All Top
Austria 270 28 74% 57% 10% 11% 17% 32%
Belgium 551 52 70% 23% 06% 12% 23% 65%
Denmark 365 17 78% 41% 13% 35% 10% 24%
Finland 236 8 78% 25% 11% 25% 11% 50%
France 1538 162 59% 25% 28% 44% 13% 30%
Germany 1835 109 77% 43% 13% 25% 10% 32%
Greece 366 18 68% 33% 11% 11% 21% 56%
Ireland 154 12 77% 42% 01% 08% 22% 50%
Italy 1030 94 62% 33% 17% 30% 20% 37%
Netherds 1628 94 76% 40% 11% 31% 12% 29%
Spain 1245 126 78% 52% 13% 18% 10% 29%
Sweden 683 40 85% 65% 09% 18% 06% 18%
Swiss 486 42 63% 33% 07% 07% 30% 60%
UK 5573 290 76% 44% 17% 32% 08% 23%
Column 2 gives the number of active authors in the country and column 3
the number of authors having published at least one paper in a top journal.
Mobility is indicated as the percentage of these publishing authors that have
moved at least once. Pmii and Pmoi correspond to the columns marked All.
the percentage of authors that had a national or an international mobil-
ity. We made that computation for all researchers and for top researchers
separately. We have obtained a contrasted sketch of individual mobility
in Europe. Most authors never change, except eventually in countries like
France, Italy and Switzerland. In France and in Italy, the centralised proce-
dure for recruiting based on the Napoleonian model of organisation may be
an explanation. When we turn to top authors, the picture becomes totally
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different. Most authors do change, except in Austria, Spain and Sweden.
In small countries that share a common language with an immediate neigh-
bouring large country like Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Switzerland, top
authors move most often for a foreign country. This also the case for Greece.
In other countries, top authors move in a comparable proportion inside their
country and for a foreign country.
6 Hierarchical multilevel models
Hierarchical linear models were designed to model observations that are
regrouped into clusters. The main domain of application in economics is
school achievement where individuals are scholars endowed with a measure
of schooling performance and clusters are schools (see the US High School
and Beyond data set from The National Center for Education Statistics and
the survey article of Goldstein and Spiegelhalter 1996). Hierarchical linear
models will be the device that we shall use to mix together the log linear
individual life-cycle model with the theory of social capital that consider the
individual in her environment. To quote Coleman (1988) “The conception
of social capital as a resource for action is one way of introducing social
structure into the rational action paradigm”. He illustrates his demonstra-
tion using an example concerning high school dropouts. He showed that
Catholic schools had a lower rate of drop out than public schools, explain-
ing this difference by a common background both at the school and the
parent levels. The same data were analysed, with similar conclusions in
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) using linear hierarchical models. We shall
follow the same route, showing how individual decision parameters of the
life-cycle model are modified by contextual variables at the department level
and can thus contribute to explain the variability of scientific production.
6.1 A simple model with random effects
Let us consider log of the total score Kij of an individual i belonging to
institution j and measured at the end of the period. Our regression model
is
logKij = β0 + β1eij + β2e
2
ij + x
′
ijβ + vij vij ∼ N(0, σ
2). (13)
The log score is explained by a constant term and a set of predictors, all
observed at the individual level. These variables are on one side the life-
cycle variables (experience and cohort dummies), and on the other side
variables representing the individual network characteristics and publishing
habits. These variables indicate how the individual has made use of her
social capital (collaborations and network).
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Authors are regrouped into departments (or clusters) where they can
share unobserved common individual features, due for instance to a partic-
ular recruiting policy but also a place where they share a common social
capital. The first way of introducing the possibility of a department effect is
to consider a specific constant term per institution called β0j . In a random
effect model, the β0j are normally distributed with mean β0 and variance ω
2
while being independent of the vij . We have thus a hierarchical structure,
here represented in a simplified manner as:
logKij = β0j + x
′
ijβ + vij vij ∼ N(0, σ
2)
β0j = β0 + uj uj ∼ N(0, ω
2), uj⊥vij,
(14)
This model introduces a correlation between individuals inside the same
department which is given by
ρ =
ω2
ω2 + σ2
. (15)
The higher this correlation, the higher will be the unobserved sharing of
a common social capital. We must note that this variance decomposition
assumes that uj⊥vij and β0j⊥vij.
The interpretation of constant terms in this model depends heavily on
the metric which is used for measuring the predictors. β0 represents the
average score of all the departments while β0j represents the average score
of department j. This interpretation is valid when all the predictors are set
equal to zero. This particular value of zero might be meaningful for most
variables, but certainly not for experience that has to be strictly positive. In
order to recover a clear interpretation for the constant terms, the predictors
are usually centered around a common value, usually their sample mean. We
have the choice between centering around the grand mean (the mean of the
whole sample) or around the local mean (the institution or cluster mean).
When the predictors are centered around their local mean, β0j = β0 + uj
represents the cluster mean of the log individual scores when the predictors
are taken equal to their local mean. More precisely:
logKij = β0j + (x
′
ij − X¯
′
.j)β + vij (16)
where X¯.j is a vector of empirical means computed over i for a given j. The
uj = β0j − β0 represent the deviation of the department means from the
grand mean. The uj can be used to rank departments according to their
mean score. This is the usual way to rank schools (see e.g. Goldstein and
Thomas 1996).
How to center the predictors constitutes a large debate in the applied
literature, see for instance Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, page 31). Because
it cannot be zero, the experience predictor eij is centered around a given
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value L. We have chosen to center it around L = 1, so the obtained mean
score will be that of authors having one year of experience, which is the
modal value in many countries of our sample.
6.2 A more general model
Cooperative social capital variables are introduced at the department level.
They modify the potentialities of the individuals, which means either their
mean score or the yield of their experience. We regroup in zj these sur-
rounding variables.6 Introducing a second random effect, for instance on
experience, the enlarged model is
logKij = β0j + e˜ijβ1j + e˜
2
ijβ2 + x˜ijβ + vij
β0j = β0 + zjγ0 + u0j
β1j = β1 + zjγ1 + u1j .
(17)
where e˜ij is experience centered around L and x˜ij are the other predictors
centered around their local mean. This model says that individual scores
vary around a local mean β0j , the mean department score, according to ex-
perience and individual characteristics x˜ij . The local mean β0j varies around
the grand mean and this variation depends on department characteristics
zj . The yield of individual experience β1j varies around a global mean β1
and this variation depends also on department characteristics.
Both u0j and u1j are independent of vij . But u0j and u1j can be cor-
related. If uj is the vector formed by the concatenation of u0j and u1j , we
have
uj ∼ N(0,Ω). (18)
u0j indicates how much the mean log score of department j deviates from
the grand mean β0, conditionally on zj. u1j indicates how much the average
yield of a supplementary year of experience deviates from its average β1,
conditionally on zj . A positive correlation would mean that the higher the
average score of the department is, the higher the return to one year of
experience.
Model (17) can be expressed in a reduced form which is convenient for
estimation:
logKij = β0 + e˜ijβ1 + e˜
2
ijβ2 + x˜ijβ
+zjγ0 + e˜ijzjγ1 + u0j + e˜iju1j + vij .
Note the rather complex structure of the error term u0j+ e˜iju1j+vij and the
fact that level-two variables appear in a product with the predictors. Due
6The level-two variables are usually not centered because we are not interested in the
interpretation of the grand mean β0 or of β1.
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to the particular structure of the error term, this model has to be estimated
using either iterated GLS, the EM algorithm or a Gibbs sampler (see Zeger
and Karim 1991 for a Bayesian approach).
7 Empirical results for Europe
We have a pooled sample of 14 European countries covering 16 750 indi-
viduals indexed by i distributed over 512 departments indexed by j. For
measuring their capital stock, we have used (12) with a δ taken as a func-
tion of journal quality.7
7.1 The initial life-cycle model
We first estimate our model allowing for a random effect on the constant
term, with the clusters being the departments. The first estimation is simply
an analysis of variance:
logKij = 2.09
[0.014]
+ vij + uj − 2 log lik = 43 276, BIC = 43 288.
There is definitively a clustering effect because of the large significance of
Table 4: ANOVA
Parameter Estimate Std Error Z Value
σ2v 0.755 0.0084 90.4
ω2u 0.0493 0.0055 8.92
ρ 0.061
ω2u, given in Table 4. However, 93.9% of the variance is located within the
departments and only 6.1% between the departments. So that of course the
intra-class correlation is small (ρ = 0.061), which is not uncommon with
education data.
Let us now introduce the life-cycle variables and see how this initial
variance is reduced. This will be a test of the validity of the initial life-cycle
model:
logKij = 1.46
[0.014]
− 0.016
[0.013]
co9599 + 0.085
[0.014]
co0003 + 0.10
[0.014]
co0407
+ 0.27
[0.0029]
e− 0.087
[0.0022]
e2 + vij + uj
σ2 = 0.220 ω2 = 0.0174
−2 log lik = 22 745, BIC = 22 758,
(19)
7Note that in usual bibliometric studies and rankings, δ = 0.
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The human capital variables (cohorts and experience) have a very high ex-
planatory power. They manage to explain 71% of the variance at the individ-
ual level (1-0.220/0.755). The within correlation has increased slightly up to
0.073. Cohort effects are important, the last cohorts being more productive
than the initial one by 8 and 10 percent. This surprisingly high explanatory
power is due to the fact that we are explaining a stock of publications at
the end of a period and not an annual flux. In Figure 2, we illustrate the
Figure 2: Estimated life-cycle and cohorts for all countries
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experience curve and its inverted U shape. The period of estimation covers
17 years and we present these curves for 20 years. If we suppose that career
begins at 30, decline in productivity begins around 43.8 Kim et al. (2009)
estimated a decline in productivity after only four years of career in the US,
mainly explained by tenure acquisition.
Cohort effects have always been difficult to identify in the literature. For
instance Levin and Stephan (1991) never found that more recent vintages
are more productive than older ones in the US. Rauber and Ursprung (2008)
quote other references for the US leading to the same conclusion. However,
the same Rauber and Ursprung (2008) did find a vintage effect for German
economists, which they explain by the enormous and recent changes in the
organisation of the German academic system. The same type of changes
seems to have also occurred in the rest of Europe.
8Due to the small span of the data (17 years), we cannot reasonably introduce higher
powers to have a more precise shape for the life-cycle productivity as was done for instance
in Rauber and Ursprung (2008).
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7.2 The impact of individual characteristics
Are cohort effects solely a proxy for the change in publishing habits in term of
outlet of publication and co-authorship? If in the previous model, we replace
the cohort dummies by a set of four publishing habit variables, Pnj, Pal,
Psi and Pint, we explain 73% of the variance instead of 71%. So publishing
habits and co-authorship have a slightly better explanation power than the
cohort effect.
Let us introduce the full set of individual variables xij in the life-cycle
model. They regroup the already detailed publication habits, the ability
of publishing in top journals and the two mobility variables. They manage
to reduce further the individual variance σ2 by 18% (1-0.180/0.220) while
the within correlation stays at 0.070. Estimation results for this model are
displayed in Table 5.
Table 5: life-cycle and social norms in Europe
Effect Estimate Std. Error t or Z Value
Intercept 1.5196 0.00785 193.57
Co95-99 -0.0625 0.00808 -7.74
e 0.2412 0.00262 91.89
e2/10 -0.0855 0.00183 -46.59
Pnj -0.0042 0.00015 -27.09
Pal -0.0011 0.00012 -8.63
Psi -0.0005 0.00012 -4.71
Pint 0.0003 0.00013 2.55
P10 0.6623 0.01419 46.68
Pmi 0.1120 0.01012 11.07
Pmo 0.1840 0.01165 15.80
σ2v 0.1808 0.001992 90.29
ω2u 0.0136 0.001510 9.02
ρ 0.070
The first cohort is taken as the reference. All variables are taken
in deviation to their local mean, except for experience which is in
deviation to 1. Cohort dummies are treated as the constant term.
The constant term (grand mean) measures the average European score
(geometric mean). −2 ∗ log lik = 19 395, BIC = 19 407.
The cohort effects, which were very significant in the pure life-cycle
model, are now reduced to a single dummy, suggesting again that cohort
effects were a proxy for the change in publication habits.
Let us now analyse these results in detail:
- Publishing strategies play a very important role in explaining differ-
ences of output. In some European countries, the established social
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norm is or was to publish in national journals. This has a strong neg-
ative impact on performance. This should be put in parallel with the
findings of Bauwens et al. (2007) concerning the use of English as a
scientific vehicle. At the other extreme, being able to publish at least
once in a top journal has a very strong impact on the performance of
an author and has a high signaling power.
- It is profitable to have individual networks as publishing alone has
always a negative impact. But not every network is profitable. Being
in the same institution as her co-authors has a small negative impact
while choosing foreign co-authors is profitable. This can be interpreted
in two ways. Foreign co-authors can be chosen just because they have
a higher publishing score and thus illustrate one of the conclusions in
Kim et al. (2009). Or the opposition inside-outside networks shows
simply the importance of new ideas in scientific development.
- In the social capital literature (see Putnam 1995), mobility has always
be seen as a factor decreasing social capital because it breaks social
links. Here the effect seems to be just the opposite. Productive re-
searchers have a tendency to be mobile both inside their country and
also outside their country. Mobility is a positive factor for bringing in
new ideas and the effect is greater for foreign mobility.
The result on mobility should be taken with care. We have seen in
Table 3 that mobility was concentrated mostly among top researchers, which
creates the possibility of a bias of endogeneity.9 We shall check for this now.
7.3 Testing for exogeneity
We can suppose that mobility inside the same country is motivated by ad-
ministrative reasons and so cannot be endogenous. International mobility
on the contrary can be motivated by scientific reasons and authors with a
top score have a tendency to be more mobile as shown in Table 3. This
table also shows that there are large country differences. We are going to
build a two level model explaining international mobility, using the same
exogenous variables as in model (5) and add instrumental variables. As in-
struments, we have chosen country dummies (using UK as a reference) plus
characteristics of the hosting institution which has managed to attract the
new researcher: Nm10, Nal, Nsia, Nz, N10, Nei, Nea, Nint, Nmul. A
specification search produced the results displayed in Table 6 with a random
coefficient on the grand mean. From this model, we infer that a department
manages to attract foreigners when it has already strong international coop-
erations (Nint), researchers with a strong experience (Nea), not necessarily
9This question was raised by Russell Davidson.
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Table 6: Decision to join a new department
when leaving a foreign country
Effect Estimate Std. Error t or Z Value
Cste -0.09054 0.01958 -4.62
e 0.02855 0.00168 16.96
e2/10 -0.00902 0.00121 -7.41
P10 0.06791 0.00981 6.92
Pal 0.00097 0.00008 11.07
Psia 0.00055 0.00008 6.39
Pint 0.00210 0.00008 23.72
Aus 0.05613 0.02355 2.38
Bel 0.09170 0.02237 4.10
Fra 0.03875 0.01130 3.43
Gre 0.07976 0.02012 3.96
Ita 0.1015 0.01276 7.96
Nld 0.03836 0.01540 2.49
Spa 0.05444 0.01373 3.96
Swi 0.1215 0.02045 5.94
Nal 0.1108 0.03722 2.98
Nint 0.3987 0.03170 12.58
Nei -0.04105 0.00676 -6.07
Nea 0.02766 0.00568 4.87
σ2v 0.08730 0.000965 90.47
ω2u 0.00176 0.000331 5.32
ρ 0.020
gained in the hosting institution (Nei) which suggest the influence of a past
mobility of the members of the hosting institution.
Let us now introduce the predicted value of the endogenous variable in
model (5). This is a test of exogeneity. This predicted variable appears
with a t value of 0.14 which shows that there is no endogeneity bias for the
mobility variable Pmo.
7.4 Explaining department effects
Individuals do have a different mean score according to which department
they belong. But differences in mean score are certainly not the sole random
effect as departments can have a specific effect on productivity for instance.
We have tried to introduce all random effects whenever they were signifi-
cant. Starting from an initial model with a BIC = 19 408, we managed to
add three extra random effects on the following variables: e, P10, Pmo to
reach a BIC = 19 208. The yield of experience varies between departments
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as well as the efficiency of being able to publish in a top journal and the
efficiency of international mobility. The importance and significance of these
random effects are indicated in Table 7. At level-two, the total variance is
Table 7: Random effects without Z variables
Parameter Estimate Std Error Z Value
σ2v 0.1738 0.00196 88.46
ω2cste 0.01148 0.00143 8.02
ω2e 0.00016 0.00002 5.73
ω2P10 0.03082 0.00895 3.44
ω2Pmo 0.01060 0.00402 2.64
−2 log lik = 19 176, BIC = 19 207
0.0531 so that differences in mean score still represents 22% of the variance.
Differences in international mobility represents 20% of the variance while
the capacity to publish in top journals represent the greatest part with 58%
of the variance. Differences in experience (measured in years) are a neg-
ligible part of the variance even if they are very significant.10 With this
simple analysis of variance, we can say that 78% of the differences between
departments are due to specific department effects while 22% are due to
their capacity in attracting researchers with an important score.
What are the characteristics that explain these differences between de-
partments? We introduce now level-two variables for each of the four level-
two equations. Section 5.2 has given us hints on the possible nature of these
effects. They are indicators related to the nature of the department social
capital.
The final list appearing in Table 8 was obtained as follows. We tried the
whole list of variables provided in section 5.2 and reduced it sequentially,
equation by equation. Among the nine variables proposed in section 5.2, we
managed to introduce only six of them: N10 the number of top authors in
the department, Nz the size of the department (in term of productive au-
thors), Nei the mean experience within the department, Nea the mean total
experience, Nint the proportion of papers written with foreign co-authors,
Nmul the number of authors having multiple affiliations. Other variables
were not significant (Nal the proportion of papers written alone, Nsi the
proportion of papers written only with members of the same department,
Nm10 the number of top authors that have left the department). Adding
these six variables reduces the level-two variance by 30%.
The mean score of a department β0j is influenced in a positive way
by the number of top authors N10 who thus play there a leading role.
The mean score of a department is also influenced by the proportion of
10There is a scaling effect because our model is formulated in terms of number of years
of experience. If we scale it differently, the value of ω2e will be different.
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Table 8: Random effect and departments characteristics
Effect Estimate Std. Error t or Z Values
Intercept 1.5318 0.06450 23.75
Co00− 07 0.0483 0.00800 6.05
e 0.2330 0.00283 82.17
e2/10 -0.0830 0.00179 -46.28
P10 0.5473 0.02759 19.84
Pnj -0.0042 0.00015 -26.84
Pal -0.0011 0.00012 -8.28
Psi -0.0006 0.00012 -4.87
Pint 0.00033 0.00012 2.54
Pmi 0.1221 0.01016 12.01
Fin -0.0989 0.03885 -2.55
Fra -0.0830 0.02100 -3.96
Gre -0.1184 0.03290 -3.60
Irl -0.1655 0.05266 -3.14
N10 0.0033 0.00087 3.80
Nint 0.2875 0.05826 4.93
Nei 0.0152 0.00573 2.66
Nmul -0.1418 0.06078 -2.33
P10 ∗N10 0.00633 0.00183 3.45
e ∗Nz 0.000063 0.000015 4.10
Pmo ∗Nea 0.03724 0.00278 13.38
σ2v 0.1742 0.00196 88.47
σ2cste 0.00665 0.00105 6.34
σ2e 0.00013 0.00002 5.58
σ2P10 0.02249 0.00761 2.95
σ2Pmo 0.00772 0.00367 2.10
The first cohort is taken as the reference. All variables are taken in deviation
to their local mean, except for experience which is in deviation to 1. The
constant term (grand mean) measures the average European score (geometric
mean because of the logs). −2 log lik = 19153, BIC = 19122.
papers written with foreign coauthors Nint (with a large coefficient) and
by the mean duration in the affiliation Nei. Conversely, the mean number
of explicitly declared affiliations has a negative influence on the mean total
score. Multiple affiliations in a department corresponds to a scraping of
social capital. We have here for science a correspondance with the diagnostic
made by Putnam (1995) for everyday society.
Variations in the yield of experience, in the yield of being able to publish
in top journals and in the yield of mobility still represent 82% of the level-two
residual variance. The size of a department positively influences the yield of
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experience, with however a very small coefficient. The yield of being able to
publish in top journals is positively influenced by the number of top authors
in the department. We have a collaboration enhancing effect, simply due to
the presence of other top authors which does not necessarily goes through
effective collaboration. As a matter of fact Nsia does not enter the model.
The yield of international mobility Pmo enters the model solely in inter-
action with the mean total experience of members of the department, Nea.
Stated otherwise, mobility brings in new idea; when joining a new depart-
ment, it is better to have stayed abroad. And this effect is larger when the
mean seniority of your new department is higher.
7.5 Bourdieu or Putnam?
Collaboration or competition? We have a mixed view on the internal struc-
ture of a department. Social capital and the scientific collaboration it entails
have a clear positive influence on the production of science. However, mo-
bility has to be interpreted in a different way as that of Putnam (1995).
Mobility brings in new ideas, while multiple affiliations is a waste for col-
laboration and personal investment in the functioning of the institution.
Formal inside-collaboration has a negative effect at the individual level
while it does not appear at the institutional level. The yield of being able
to publish in a top journal is enhanced by the presence of other top re-
searchers in the department, but this does not result necessarily in formal
collaboration (as Nsia does not enter the model).
International collaboration, both at the personal level and at the insti-
tutional level, has a large positive role. But we have also seen in section 5.3
that it was correlated with multiple affiliations, which plays a negative role.
Social capital in the fields of economics of science is a complex phe-
nomenon which mixes contradictory aspects. It is a balance between per-
sonal and collective strategies. Personal strategies clearly need collective
goods in order to be efficient. But if they are pushed too far with multiple
affiliations, they lead to a loss of collective efficiency. This fragile balance
is illustrated by some of the findings of Kim et al. (2009) who show that
elite US universities (in economics and finance) are loosing their competitive
edge as authors affiliated to second rank universities also manage to publish
in top journals.
8 Ranking European economic departments
Mixed linear models are used for combining data collected at different lev-
els and take advantage of particular correlation structures. In the above
sections, we have detailed how fixed factors, at the individual level and at
the department level, had a significant impact on individual research out-
put. A random effect on the mean indicates how institutions deviate from
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an average European score. Random effects have been used in the litera-
ture to rank institutions. Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996), Goldstein and
Thomas (1996) are good examples of what can be done in this respect for
secondary schools and other public institutions.
8.1 Rankings using multilevel models
The best way to understand how these models can be used for ranking
is to start from the pure variance component model which includes only an
overall constant term (the grand mean) and a random effect which considers
random deviations from that grand mean at the institution level. When one
wants to rank schools using student results at standardised tests such as
those collected in PISA,11 the best school is the one for which the average
rate of success or the average grade is the highest. In the pure variance
component model of individual scores yij,
yij = β0j + vij
β0j = β0 + uj,
(20)
uj represents the gap between the grand mean β0 and the local mean of
school j, so that β0 + uj can thus be directly used for ranking. Standard
deviations are of course necessary to appraise the uncertainty attached to
the ranking. In this model, the uj are normally distributed with:
uj ∼ N
(∑
i(yij − y¯.j)
nj + σ2/ω2
, (nj + σ
2/ω2)−1
)
(21)
where nj is the number of scholars in school j.
In our case, the grand mean represents the author mean log score com-
puted over the entire population and uj represents the the gap between the
grand mean and the mean log score of department j. In order to get the
total log score of department j, we must consider an expression like
sctj = (β0 + uj)× nj (22)
where nj represents a department size to be discussed later on. Departments
are usually ranked according to their total score. Eventually according to
the total number of authors. It was shown in Lubrano and Protopopescu
(2004) that this corresponds to a notion related to stochastic dominance at
the order one or two when a minimum level of activity is defined. Ranking
departments according to the mean score of their members makes no sense.
11OECD Programme for International Student Assessment.
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The initial model was enriched by adding individual exogenous variables,
leading to
yij = β0j + xijβ1 + vij
β0j = β0 + uj.
(23)
The ranking can be done here according to the same principle, except that
this time, the uj are distributed according to:
uj ∼ N
(∑
i(yij − xijβ1)
nj + σ2/ω2
, (nj + σ
2/ω2)−1
)
, (24)
leading to smaller standard deviations than in the pure ANOVA model.
Figure 3: European ranking using a random intercept
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Pure ANOVA
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Single random effect and individual predictors
In Figure 3, we give the ranking of the first thirty European departments,
using these two methods. On the left panel, the ranking is obtained using
the pure variance component model, while in the right panel we have added
individual exogenous variables. There are some marginal variations between
the two rankings, especially around the bottom. The ranking which makes
use of exogenous variables provides smaller standard errors.
Confidence intervals show that the significant differences are at the top
of the ranking, while most of the departments are equivalent when reaching
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the bottom. With the pure ANOVA model, UK has 14 departments in this
ranking, the Netherlands 5, France 3, Belgium 2, Germany 2, Denmark 1,
Sweden 1, Spain 1 and Switzerland 1. We have given countries in the rank
of their first appearance. Note the performance of the Netherlands that
manage to have 40% of its departments in the top 30.
8.2 Size effects
In the two rankings given in Figure 3, there is a huge size effect which
explains incidently why smaller departments with a high reputation like
the European Institute of Florence do not appear favourably, while larger
departments like Leeds, Manchester, Nottingham, Groningen or Wageningen
have a surprising good position. The size effect appears because we have
chosen nj = Nzj in (22). We could perfectly use another size indicator
based on for instance:
nj = Nz
α
j ×N10
1−α
j . (25)
Nzj represents the total number of productive authors in department j while
N10j represents the number of top authors present in department j at the
end of the period of observation. (25) entails a weight of zero if there is no
top researcher in a department and then lowers the size effect as a function
of α. With α = 1, we recover the previous ranking based solely on Nzj.
α monitors the trade-off between size Nz and quality N10. We present in
Figure 4 two alternative rankings: one with α = 0.50 in the left panel, one
with α = 0.10 in the right panel.
Already with α = 0.50, the resulting ranking is totally modified. Most
of the large departments like Leeds, Manchester, Reading and Sheffield in
the UK or Groningen and Wageningen in the Netherlands have left the top
thirty group. However, we need α = 0.1 for allowing the small and elitist
European Institute to enter the list. With this last value for α, the UK
looses some ground with 7, but keeps its first position, France comes next
and has 5 ranked departments, Belgian 1, Spain climbs up in the ranking
and has 3, the position of the Netherlands drops in the ranking and has
5, Germany 3, Sweden 2, Switzerland 1, Italy 2, Denmark 1 and Austria 1
enters the list.
8.3 Ranking and social capital
Ranking is a very crude ordinal operation that usually piles up weighted
articles, independently of any type of explanations. We have tried in section
7 to find some of the determinants to scientific production and we have used
one of our models to propose rankings with associated confidence intervals.
We try now to answer the question concerning the link between rankings and
social capital. We have measured the social capital of an institution with
nine department variables. How are these variables related to our rankings
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Figure 4: European ranking using a composite size
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and when we vary α, what does it means in terms of weights given to the
different components of social capital. Table 9 reports the significant corre-
lations between our different rankings and the nine social capital variables.
All rankings seems to be independent of internal collaboration or multiple af-
Table 9: Ranking and social capital
Nz N10 Nm10 Nal Nsia Nint Nei Nea Nmul
α = 1.0 -0.99 -0.68 -0.70 - -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 - -
α = 0.5 -0.91 -0.90 -0.80 - - -0.32 -0.25 -0.14 -
α = 0.1 -0.77 -0.98 -0.78 - - -0.37 -0.27 -0.20 -
α = 0.0 -0.68 -0.98 -0.77 - - -0.41 -0.27 -0.22 -
A negative correlation is associated to a better ranking. Correlations were computed for the
212 departments that had at least one top author, as the other departments could not be
ranked whenever α < 1. The non-parametric Spearman correlation is used to cope with any
type of non-linearity.
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filiations.12 All rankings are highly correlated with past reputation (Nm10).
A greater weight put on quality (a smaller α) corresponds to a greater in-
fluence given to international collaboration, a greater weight given to the
mean length of affiliation (the ability of an institution to keep its members)
and to a smaller extend a greater weight given to total experience.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to derive a theoretical model of scientific
production based on the human capital model. We empirically verified the
life- cycle assumption which appears to be an important factor explaining
scientific production. However, this simple individual decision model is not
sufficient to explain the diversity of scientific productivity. We completed
this model by introducing individual characteristics, and by situating the in-
dividual action in a social context, namely external networks and the hosting
institution.
Personal characteristics have a large impact to explain diversity: clearly
belonging to the small class of authors being able to publish in top journals is
a strong positive marker. Conversely, publishing alone is a negative personal
marker.
Personal networks are associated with Bourdieu’s view on social capital.
We have a kind of selfish use of social networks. International collaboration
is profitable for individuals while internal collaboration is not. Personal
networks are the occasion of international mobility which brings in new
ideas and are profitable for individuals.
At the institutional level, we observe the negative effect of some parts
of individual networks. For instance, simultaneous multiple affiliations have
no explanatory power at the individual level, but have a negative influence
at the collective level. If at the individual level, internal collaboration is
negative, at the collective level, there must exist some sort of invisible col-
laboration because total size, total number of top researchers and mean
seniority in the institution have a positive influence. Finally, there exists
some common features between individual and collective social capital: in-
ternational collaboration is profitable at both levels.
The grasp we had about social capital is not perfect. Bibliographical
data bases reveal a lot of information concerning authors habits, choices
and networks. They are however mute on a tiny part of papers, we mean
acknowledgments. Acknowledgements refer to conversations, discussions,
information release, comments and improvements made on the paper. They
relate to a participation to social capital, not necessarily the social capital
of the authors’ institution, but sometime yes. This fact was pointed out to
12However with a simple linear correlation coefficient, multiple affiliations seems to be
inversely related to a better rank.
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us by Tony Atkinson who alluded to some department members who were
not productive in the usual meaning of this word, i.e. they did not write
many papers, but who contributed very much to the work of others by their
remarks and implications. These people are outside any type of statistical
evaluation, but clearly belong to the social capital of the institution.
Appendix: A life-cycle model in continuous time
The proposed model in continuous time draws extensively on the papers
by Diamond (1987) and McDowell (1982). The production function for
supplementary human capital Qt has the form of a Cobb-Douglas
Qt = β(stKt)
α. (26)
The stock of human capital has a rate of obsolescence δ so that
.
Kt= Qt − δKt. (27)
The objective function of the scientist is to maximise his discounted future
income. Current income Yt is given by
Yt = w(1− st)Kt, (28)
and the present value at age t of disposable future income:
U =
∫ T
t
e−r(τ−t)Y (τ) dτ =
∫ T
t
e−r(τ−t)w(1− s(τ))K(τ) dτ, (29)
A solution to this problem is found by writing the Hamiltonian
H = e−rtYt + λ(Qt − δKt). (30)
Its solution expresses Qt as a function of the parameters of the model and
of the remaining time to retirement, T − t. Production or investment in
human capital Qt is a non-linear decreasing function of time with:
logQt =
1
1− α
log β +
α
1− α
log
α
δ + r
+
α
1− α
log(1− e−(δ+r)(T−t)). (31)
The solution in Qt is zero when t = T (the age of retirement). The existence
of the solution requires that α < 1 (contrary to our discrete time model
where α = 1). When combining this equation with the capital variation
equation, Kt has an inverted U shape life-cycle profile.
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